Chapter 8 · Forecasts and scenarios
Whose forecast, in which units?
Big AI numbers differ because they measure different things: global value potential, U.S. GDP levels, productivity growth, jobs supported. They are compared here on their own terms and never added together.
| Sponsor | Published | Geography | Measures | Flow or level | Horizon | Value | Key assumptions | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Penn Wharton Budget Model | 2025-09-08 | United States | Level of GDP and productivity vs no-AI baseline | Level effect (cumulative); Real | 2035 / 2055 / 2075 | +1.5% (2035), ~+3% (2055), +3.7% (2075) | Near-full within ~15 years. Automates 23% of exposed tasks; labor savings 25% rising to 40%. Costs: Not netted. Baseline: No generative AI. | verified |
| Daron Acemoglu (NBER w32487) | 2024-05 | United States | Total factor productivity | Cumulative over 10 years; Real | 10 years | ≤ +0.66% TFP (< +0.53% adjusted) | Task share impacted from exposure studies. Cost savings at task level. Costs: n/a. Baseline: No AI. | verified |
| McKinsey Global Institute | 2023-06 | Global | Economic value potential of use cases | Annual flow; Nominal (2023 USD) | Annual potential, no date | $2.6T to $4.4T per year | Full capture of modeled use cases. Assumes redeployment. Costs: Not netted. Baseline: Unclear. | not re-verified this pass |
| SIEPR (Stanford) | 2026-10 | United States | Manufacturing jobs supported by data-center capex | Stock at a run rate; n/a | 2026 run rate | ~304,000 jobs (150k to 450k+) | n/a. No substitution. Costs: n/a. Baseline: Zero data-center capex. | verified |
Adoption scenarios
Low, base and high, with a backtest.
Left to choose its own ceiling, the fit runs to the 100% bound: three years of a still-rising series cannot tell us where adoption saturates. So every ceiling here is an explicit assumption: low 65%, base 80%, high 95%. No scenario can exceed 100%. Census history under a consistent question is only one year long, too short to fit honestly, so it is not projected.
Ramp paid adoption: observed, and three scenarios to 2030
Observed only. Switch on scenarios to see assumption-driven paths.
Observed adoption reaches 56.8%. Backtest predicted 50.9% for 2026-10 versus 56.8% observed.
Backtest. Fitted only on data through 2025-10, the base (80% ceiling) curve predicted 50.9% for 2026-10; Ramp observed 56.8% (error -5.9 points; in-sample RMSE 1.08 points).
Caveat. Logistic curves fitted to a vendor sample. A ceiling is an assumption, not a finding. Paid adoption says nothing about productive use, output or wages.
Inspect the evidence
- National adoption (use Census for that, which has too little consistent history to fit).
- Intensity of use per adopter.
- Any economic outcome.
- Ramp overall series (observed)
- Grid-search least-squares logistic fit with fixed ceilings (65%, 80%, 95%); an unconstrained fit hits the 100% bound
- Backtest: fit through 2025-10, predict 2026-10
Text description. Observed adoption reaches 56.8%. Backtest predicted 50.9% for 2026-10 versus 56.8% observed.
Assumptions lab
Move the assumptions, watch the number.
A first-order model in the style of Acemoglu (2024). It shows which assumptions drive the big forecasts. Every output here is a scenario.
Forecast assumptions lab
First-order level effect on U.S. GDP: labor share × exposed share × tasks changed × cost saving × adoption × implementation success.
40% of labor income exposed; 23% of exposed tasks automated; ~30% cost saving (25% rising to 40%); near-full adoption.
Scenario output
higher U.S. GDP level at the horizon than without AI, under these assumptions.
With Penn Wharton-like inputs this returns about 1.4%, close to their published 1.5% by 2035, a consistency check rather than independent support. With Acemoglu-like inputs it returns about 0.65%, in line with his bound of 0.66% TFP over ten years.
Left out on purpose: new tasks and products, demand expansion, reallocation of displaced workers, investment and energy costs, price pass-through, import leakage. Time saved does not automatically become paid output, and higher productivity does not automatically raise employment.